What is an individual? The view from Christianity by Bialecki, Jon & Daswani, Girish
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: What is an individual? The view from Christianity
Citation for published version:
Bialecki, J & Daswani, G 2015, 'Introduction: What is an individual? The view from Christianity' HAU:
Journal of Ethnographic Theory, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 271-294. DOI: 10.14318/hau5.1.013
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.14318/hau5.1.013
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Jon Bialecki and Girish Daswani
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
2015 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 5 (1): 271–294
 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons  
| © Jon Bialecki and Girish Daswani.  
ISSN 2049-1115 (Online). DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.14318/hau5.1.013
SPECIAL SECTION INTRODUCTION
What is an individual?
The view from Christianity
Jon Bialecki, University of Edinburgh
Girish Daswani, University of Toronto
The introduction to this special section of Hau focuses on the tensions between individualism 
and dividualism as modes of personhood; while this essay approaches this foundational 
anthropological question through recent debates in the anthropology of Christianity, its 
larger concern is to reopen the question of in/dividualism in order to see whether we can 
imagine different relations between these two forms of being. As part of this discussion, 
this introductory essay rehearses the history of individualism and dividualism as concepts, 
reviews the current controversy over partible Christian personhood in Melanesia, and 
attends to recent debates about the relation between religion, the nation, and the state in 
Papua New Guinea that have followed from defacement of the Papuan Parliament Building. 
Synthesizing this material, we argue for a shift in framing of the question of in/dividualism. 
Rather than viewing dividualism and individualism as merely heuristics, or as vying but 
extant modes of organizing the subject, we suggest that in/dividualisms are best thought 
of as actualizations of a unitary underlying generative problematic. This is a problematic 
not merely for the anthropologist but for the anthropologist’s interlocutors as well; and 
as this problematic is worked through in various locales, we should expect not merely a 
wide variety of dividual and individual crystallizations of the person but also we should 
anticipate particular ethnographic milieus expressing complex emergent relations between 
the various extant dividualisms and individualisms.
Keywords: Individualism, dividualism, Christianity, personhood, relationality
The essays contained in this special section have two points of origin. As their ul-
timate point of departure, these essays all ask questions regarding the constitution 
and plasticity of the subjects that have been a driving anthropological concern since 
Marcel Mauss (1985) first asked what an anthropologically-informed genealogy 
of the person would look like. The essays address the constellation of selves, roles, 
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responsibilities, and duties that the problem of the in/dividual raises through differ-
ent social and cultural contexts; and they do so not merely in places that have adopt-
ed or been exposed to Christian notions of the self but in any place where the force 
or pace of modernity has threatened to thin the constitutive web of social relations 
and thereby give rise to new constructions of the self, or where novel constructions 
of the persons struggle to hold sway. It is true that all these contributions collectively 
ask, in one way or anther, the question “does the Christian in/dividual matter, and 
why (not)?” However, the answers that they give suggest that this is a question that 
is of importance not just to those studying self-identified “Christian” populations 
but also potentially to all scholars who work on the full variety of ways in which hu-
man beings comprehend and create themselves as self-conscious agents in the world. 
This special section therefore also attempts to retrieve some of the importance and 
danger of the individual and the dividual as relevant frameworks for anthropological 
thinking. The individual/dividual nexus provides a good analogy for the different—
but connected—ways that people have been described as related or relatable, and 
potentially provides a cultural and ethical foundation for how people think about 
and take on positions of connection and separation. But thinking of individualism 
and dividualism as dynamics that mutually implicate each other, rather than as long-
established anthropological typologies, is also an opportunity to rediscover what was 
compelling and intellectually risky about this question when it were first introduced 
to the discipline; and it may even serve as an opportunity to imagine how we might 
take the opposition between the individual and the dividual and sublate it.
That is the ultimate point of departure; the proximate point of departure for this 
discussion, however, are the debates that centered on Mark Mosko’s (2010) critique 
of Joel Robbins and other ethnographers of Melanesian Christianity in his 2008 
Curl Prize-winning paper, Partible penitents: Dividual personhood and Christian 
practice in Melanesia and the West. In that paper, Mosko argues that ethnographic 
depictions of Christianity in Melanesia misapprehends what he takes to be a vital 
feature of Christianity: that the Christian Person was fundamentally dividual, in 
the sense of the term as used by Marilyn Strathern. As Robbins argues, though, 
both in his response to Mosko (Robbins 2010) and throughout his oeuvre, Mosko 
and arguments similar to Mosko’s ignores a sense common to many Melanesians 
that the adoption of Christianity does mark a epochal change in their history. Fur-
ther, Robbins insists that Mosko’s claim also does not grasp that an important part 
of that change has been a Melanesian grappling with individualism, a mode of per-
sonhood that had been heretofore hypotrophied in Melanesia, and that is to many 
Melanesian minds closely associated with their new religion.
This discussion, and other recent anthropological claims about Christian indi-
vidualism, dividualism, or partiability (see, e.g., Bialecki 2011, 2015; Coleman 2004, 
2011; Chua 2012; Daswani 2011, 2015; Errington and Gewertz 2010; Handman 
2015a; Keane 2007; Robbins 2002, 2007; Vilaça 2011; Werbner 2011) without doubt 
grounds this set of essays. But it would be a mistake to only attend to the proximate 
point of origin of this discussion. While all these essays thread themselves through 
relatively recent discussions in the anthropology of Christianity, this special section 
tries to do this work while attending to the varied and variable sense of dividualism 
(LiPuma 1998). The people we study and work with, Christian or not, may not be 
tied to one model of subjectivity. They might very well lean toward one mode of 
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being a person more than another while also acknowledging the multiple modes 
available to them, which they embrace at different moments, or when it becomes 
appropriate to do so—allowing themselves to alternate between inner and outer 
forms of religious practice. Seen from this perspective a person potentially includes 
individual and dividual aspects of the self that also become entwined through the 
decisions that he or she makes about when to take on different roles or masks and 
within a range of possible moral and social frameworks. As the discussion in this 
special section shows, questions of personhood are not quantum grids constitut-
ing fixed and mutually irreconcilable positions; nor are they entirely plastic flows, 
capable of taking any form whatsoever. They are rather responses to specific prob-
lematics and thus their variability both between, and within, various collectivities is 
not a renunciation of the idea of some mode of immanent structuration of the per-
son but evidence for that claim. In short, while it is about a particular contestation 
in the fast-growing but still somewhat specialized anthropology of Christianity, 
this special section also has relevance for those of us who strive to understand the 
combined task that people have of considering and cultivating an awareness of self 
(what am I?) and the work that they perform in enacting social roles and responsi-
bilities toward themselves and others (when am I?).
Dividualism’s history
It is difficult to get to the genetic aspects that underlay in/dividualism because, as 
contrasting typologies, individualism and dividualism summon each other up as 
fully formed entities: as mutually constituting categories, there is no individual, 
except insofar as there is a dividual, and the reverse is true as well. Even if we agree 
that these concepts still serve as ideal types that have significance as each other’s 
antipodes, we still have to account for how this opposition has come about. How 
has in/dividualism been used? How do we tell where “dividuals” end and “indi-
viduals” begin and vice versa?
The assumption that we can render these terms mutually exclusive is at the core 
of the problematic that makes the in/dividual person thinkable. Therefore, before 
we proceed to unravel the thread of possibilities that a revisitation of the debate on 
Christian personhood holds, we would like to rehearse some of the foundational 
positions concerning personhood that many anthropologists are committed to. 
This is necessary because, as is well known, discussions regarding in/dividuality 
are not limited to the anthropology of Christianity. To think about in/dividualism, 
Christian or otherwise, we have to think of the history of both the concept of the 
dividual and of the individual in anthropology.
One of the chief planks of this history, our anthropological received wisdom on 
the topic, has been that individuality and dividuality take on different degrees of 
importance that are also culturally specific. McKim Marriott (1976) and Marilyn 
Strathern (1988) are both important ethnographic thinkers who have helped us 
question the Western assumptions of the bounded, singular, individual self, as the 
main form of imagining the person, suggesting instead different constellations of 
personhood and interbeing for different milieus. Methodologically, they suggest 
that we temporarily suspend Western inflected dichotomies and allow our analyses 
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to arise from within the cultural milieus of our interlocutors, that is, from the ideas 
they have of themselves and their social lives. In Melanesia, for example, persons 
as dividuals are “frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the rela-
tionships that produce them. The singular person can be imagined as a social mi-
crocosm” (Strathern 1988: 13). In her work Strathern importantly views the body 
as a location of relations, which can be separated into gendered parts and concep-
tualized as an agent, a cause, or a relationship. Melanesian persons are not simply 
individuals made by relations of domination and hierarchy. Instead they are also 
composite beings that are coconstructed through the gifts and the detachable parts 
of others. Strathern’s idea of the “dividual” has not only found resonance in other 
parts of Melanesia but has become a “diasporic” concept, transported and trans-
posed to other parts of the world; it has become, according to Marshall Sahlins, “a 
widely distributed icon of the pre-modern subject” (Sahlins 2011: 13). It is through 
this intellectual maneuver that a specificity of locale and population found in the 
original conceptions of dividualism has slipped toward an in/dividualism binary.
Roy Wagner, another major contributor to discussions on personhood, intro-
duces the term “fractal person” through his own Austronesian perspective from 
New Ireland. In rethinking the anthropological analyses of great men and big men 
systems he proposes that the “fractal person is never a unit standing in relation to 
an aggregate, or an aggregate standing in relation to a unit, but always an entity 
with relationship integrally implied” (Wagner 1991: 163). According to Wagner 
the fractal person is neither singular nor plural since fractality “relates to, converts 
to and reproduces the whole” and this is “something as different from a sum as it 
is from an individual part” (1991: 166). The fractal person like the dividual self is 
always in the making, not as fragments of a unitary identity but as parts of ongoing 
relations between them (see also Strathern 2009: 149–51).
Theoretical concepts such as dividuality and fractality are important heuris-
tic devices in our anthropological toolkit that allow us to turn our attention away 
from bounded and static ways of thinking about personhood or the hierarchical 
relation between society and the individual and toward problematizing how we 
construct the person as an object of study. It should be remembered, though, that it 
was originally intended solely as a heuristic and not as a schematic representation 
that completely exhausts actual modes of life. As Ryan Schram (this issue) adroitly 
reminds us, the concept of the “dividual” was never meant to be “a theory of par-
ticular cultural forms” but “always a thought experiment about what social theory 
would be if it started from an alternative understanding of persons.”
From “inseparable trinity” to “possessive individualism”
The attraction of dividualism and its penumbra concepts, as well as the tempta-
tion to see them as something more along the lines of a representation of a mode 
of social life rather than of a heurist, both spring from the fact that they serve as 
powerful contrasts to regnant Euro-American visions of the constitution of the self. 
Representations of the unitary self or the individual continue to coexist and even 
dominate our social, political, and economic milieus during late liberalism. This 
ideologically laden nature of individualism does not mean that it does not have a 
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certain power to order both ethnographic data and experience; just as we saw in the 
use of dividualism as a heuristic, something about individualism as a concept also 
hits on something, even if it doesn’t exhaust the phenomena it describes, nor can it 
serve as the “truth” from the actual structures of personhood and exchange. Rather 
than merely negate a Western dualism or ignore the importance of “the individual,” 
we ought to acknowledge when and where this concept appears or presents itself as 
important—not merely in the lives of our interlocutors but also as a story that we 
come to tell ourselves; at the same time, the fictive nature of the individualism, and 
the power that comes from that fiction, should not be forgotten either.
In his book The long revolution ([1961] 2011), Raymond Williams provides a 
historical genealogy of the word “individual.” He explains how “individual” meant 
“inseparable” in medieval thought, in direct reference to the theological argument 
about the nature of the Christian Holy Trinity ([1961] 2011: 96).
The effort was to explain how a being could be thought of existing in his 
own nature yet existing by this nature as part of an indivisible whole. . . . 
The crucial history of the modern description is a change in emphasis 
which enabled us to think of “the individual” as a kind of absolute, 
without immediate reference, by the very structure of the term, to the 
group of which he is a member . . . since that time [late sixteenth century 
and early seventeenth century], we have learnt to think of “the individual 
in his own right,” where previously to describe an individual was to give 
an example of the group of which he was a member. (Williams [1961] 
2011: 96–97)
Williams explains that the history of the idea of the soul (especially during the 
Reformation) is an important trajectory through which “the individual” took on a 
more personal character and was depicted as possessing a direct relationship with 
God. With the beginnings of capitalism and increased mobility came the idea that 
“the individual” was “a source of economic activity” and “by his free enterprise” 
(Williams [1961] 2011: 98). The individual has since become the natural starting 
point of questions and debates in economics, psychology and philosophy. What 
Crawford Macpherson (1962) later referred to as “possessive individualism” has 
become a modern condition that many of us take for granted and even aspire to, 
in which the individual is a concept nestled within a systematically empowered 
discourse of the market economy and political liberalism.
An anthropological analysis, however, quickly brings us back to the importance 
of the self as socially constructed and the continuing role of gift exchange and parti-
bility where the logic of kinship and personhood intersect. Personhood, like kinship, 
is “a logic of relations” that commonly consists of two different kinds of relational 
criteria: affinity and consanguinity (Hamberger 2013: 306). These relational criteria 
help organize societies and provide the structures of relatedness that help articulate 
learned systems of feeling and acting. For example, in a society that places more 
emphasis on consanguinity, personhood is more often than not socially overde-
termined. In other words consanguinity structurally allows for fewer possibilities 
for individual self-expression, creating a hierarchical order that provides temporal 
continuity and socially prescribed roles within a community. Such a self, integrated 
in conformity with others, is compelled to specific forms of personhood. However 
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even as there are statuses prescribed to individuals as a result of their position with-
in a structure, there is also diversity of characters or of particular existences. In a 
relational model of affinity, kinship is constructed through the forging of alliances 
or through horizontal ties of exchange and acts of caring and sharing. In this model 
it is the capabilities of individual others to act on the person and to help form the 
person and not simply the socially expected attributes of persons that produces 
personhood. Magnus Course (2011) in his work on the Mapuche of Chile describes 
a model of relatedness that prioritizes affinity even as ideas of consanguinity or de-
scent are simultaneously held. If indigenous conceptions of (non-Western) person-
hood are often seen to emphasize individuality over dividuality, for the Mapuche, 
“the notion of an autonomous individual who enters social relations through his or 
her own volition is just as applicable as it is anywhere in the Western world” (Course 
2011: 111). According to Course (2011) the Mapuche are very much “Hobbesian” 
and the focus on individuality is not a result of colonialism or Christianity but a 
continuity of an indigenous philosophy. While this is true for some of the societies 
anthropologists work with, where the “individual” as an idea is rooted in traditional 
thinking, we also have to consider that in many parts of the world Christianity has 
played an important role in spreading notions of the self that focus on the “indi-
vidual” or a particular process of individuation.
Roger Bastide (1973), in his essay “Le principe d’individuation (contribution à 
une philosophie africaine),” makes a rather important observation: that the prin-
ciple of individuation is a philosophical problem brought to Melanesian or African 
societies through Christianity. And while this problem mutates and transforms in 
interaction with traditional societies, the solution that Christian scholastics have 
given to this philosophical problem are twofold: (1) individuation by matter, and 
(2) individuation by form. The first states that the Christian teaches the convert 
to discover her identity as marked by the borders of her body, that subsequently 
isolates her from other bodies. The second is explained through the Platonic solu-
tion, which bases human individuation on the divine thought that transcends the 
convert. In other words, this Christian philosophical problem of individuation, as 
adopted by the converted in Africa, shifts along two ends of a spectrum that con-
sists of materiality (matter) on the one end and shape (form) on the other. Bastide 
(1973) goes on to explain that while different possible events come to define us 
that each event exists in some way as a universal that can apply to a multiplicity of 
individuals, in a multiplicity of forms. For many anthropologists studying Chris-
tianity, especially in its Protestant and evangelical forms, that universal key value 
that individuates a subject while also making her part of an order that surpasses her 
is “the individual.”
The “philosophical” problem that Bastide identifies has social consequences. 
In the last decade the anthropology of Christianity has developed an understand-
ing of Christianity as a cultural phenomenon that provides analytical importance 
to the idea of  the “individual” in  articulating Christian personhood (Robbins 
2004; Keane 2007). Joel Robbins (2004) has described how charismatic Chris-
tians Urapmins in Papua New Guinea struggle to become individuals-in-Christ. 
In this model of conversion the Christian is described as the sole unit of salvation. 
However the Urapmin are also troubled by this model of individualism since it 
does not emphasize certain relationships of sharing, caring, and support between 
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people—attributes important to their traditional, “relationist” setting. Their at-
tempt to become Christian individuals is a work-in-progress since a relationist 
conception of social life makes it difficult for the Urapmin to fully embrace Chris-
tian individualism and its emphasis on the heart. In short, the problem for Robbins’ 
informants is not that they are individuals but that they are not individual enough. 
Webb Keane (2007) has similarly brought us closer to understanding how a partic-
ular moral framework of modernity places more attention on the individual as the 
site for struggles over agency. Keane views the Protestant individual as the outcome 
of a particular semiotic ideology, a set of interactive and public practices that place 
more importance on the inner authenticity of speech-acts (as “sincere”) that sub-
sequently define the limits of “agency.” It is when people are not properly aligned 
with the appropriate material conditions and actions associated with freedom that 
the authenticity of agency is questioned and the “fetish” reappears to trouble the 
present. Even as Robbins and Keane propose that Protestant Christianity allow for 
the increased importance of inner sincerity and individualism, their ethnographic 
subjects are struggling to properly align themselves, these ideas, and their asso-
ciated practices, with traditional life rituals, ceremonial exchanges, and cultural 
interactions. As other have also argued, an assumed importance of a Christian dis-
course of “individualism” can be misleading or perhaps insufficient (Bialecki 2011; 
Coleman 2004, 2006; Daswani 2011, 2015; Handman 2015a; Vilaça 2011). Their 
work points simultaneously to the heightened importance but ultimate impossibil-
ity of a true and unmediated Protestant Christian individuality.
The Mosko-Robbins debate
One of the most determined arguments questioning an identity between Protes-
tantism and Individualism, both outside the West but inside it as well, was put 
forth by Mark Mosko, instigating what has been called in some circles the “Mosko-
Robbins debate.” As an event, the Mosko-Robbins debate allows for the crystalliza-
tion of multiplicities inherent to Christian life and for the object of Christianity 
to reemerge as a topic central to discussions in anthropology. This debate raises 
central questions that are primarily concerned not with whether “individuals” or 
“dividuals” actually exist in a society, but with the nature of relations between them. 
The debate, at least in its current form, was commenced by Mark Mosko in his 2008 
Curl Prize-winning essay, “Partible penitents: Dividual personhood and Christian 
practice in Melanesia and the West” (2010). The target of this essay was a new genre 
of Melanesia ethnography centered on the effects that Christianity engendered. 
These accounts of Melanesian Christianity claimed that two reported features were 
associated, and that this association was not mere chance, but motivated. The first 
of the two features was the social disruption that often accompanied the adoption 
of Christianity as a religion, an occurrence that has become a part of the recent 
historical narrative told by a striking large percent of both Melanesians and Mela-
nesianists. The second feature was a shift in the anthropological literature from a 
prior understanding of the person as relational, to a current understanding where 
the person is imagined, at least ideally, as an individual, a particular agent char-
acterized by both control over alienable objects and by a moral responsibility for 
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the state of particular inalienable aspects of the self. Mosko identified this recur-
rent thematic in the writings of a set of well-received and comparatively recent 
ethnographers of Melanesian Religion: he specifically names “Barker on Maisin; 
Errington and Gewertz on Karavar Islanders; Knauft on Gebusi; and Robbins on 
Urapmin” as exemplary (Mosko 2010: 217). The problem for Mosko was not the 
linkage between shifts in personhood and religious change but rather the claim 
that there had been a shift in personhood in the first place. In Mosko’s eyes these 
ethnographic works were similar in that they all mistook a dividual exchange of 
material aspects of a partible self as something else instead; to Mosko’s eyes, they 
were misrecognized as almost commodity-like exchange of alienated objects, albeit 
objects of various degrees of concreteness.
Mosko’s argument was based on what he claimed was a refurbishing of the 
“New Melanesian Ethnography,” a vision of a relationally organized and fractal 
Melanesian person, which has a chain of custody going back to Roy Wagner and 
Marilyn Strathern. This new iteration of the NME, Mosko stated, was different 
though, in that in taking up the question of changes in ritual practice and adoption 
of world religion, it showed a capacity to think through diachronic transformations 
in the particular modes through which dividual personhood was realized. Further, 
this move answered criticism that previous instantiations of the NME were forms 
of Melanesian essentialism; this claim was invalid here, Mosko argued, because he 
was suggesting that there were aspects of Christianity, that juggernaut of Western 
cultural Imperialism, that were also assimilable to a Melanesian logic. Indeed, 
Christianity was appealing to Melanesians because it was suffused with a dividual 
logic that was recognizable to Papuan subjects—in some ways Christianity was as 
relational and partible as the Melanesians supposedly were. Thereby essentialism 
was denied, even as the claim regarding dividuality was expanded.
Mosko’s essay, published in the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 
appeared alongside response pieces by the authors whose ethnographies had been 
set up as “bad objects.” Many authors argued that Mosko had misread both their 
arguments and the underlying descriptive ethnographic material as well; in situa-
tions such as this, debates over who has the ability to interpret, and in what man-
ner, are inevitable, and attempting to police them here would just run the risk of 
our exponentially increasing the number of contestable hermeneutic exercises. It is 
the conceptual challenges, though, that are likely to capture the attention of those 
with an interest in ethnographic theory. And of those, the challenge that did the 
most to both build up and make clear the stakes of the argument was put forward 
in a response written by Joel Robbins (2010). He argued that Mosko had imported 
a language alien to that used by most Christians, and he had done so because his 
claim to having taken up the issue of diachronic change was hollow. For Robbins, a 
claim that a postconversion logic of the person was susceptible to being understood 
as a transmutation—but not a replacement—of a pre-Christian logics was simply to 
engage in “continuity thinking,” Robbins’ name for a tendency to see later religious 
forms as just the prior forms with a new coat of paint (Robbins 2007). Melanesian 
subjects, Robbins stated, saw Christianity not as a variation of old practices but 
rather as something new, and ethnographers and anthropological theorists did 
their interlocutors in the field a disservice when they did not take claims of this sort 
seriously. Robbins also argued that in seeing Christianity as dividual, Mosko had 
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denatured the cultural specificity that was supposed to be one of the distinctives of 
the NME; as Frederick Errington and Deborah Gewertz (2010) argued, in Mosko 
all exchange was reduced to dividual exchange. Rather than indicating a particu-
larly Melanesian account of sociality, Robbins argued that this tendency had recast 
the NME. It was no longer a virtual contrasting ethnographic imaginary extracted 
from Melanesian practices, which was its original impetus (Strathern 1988); in-
stead it became a generic mode of thought, just another crypto-universality social 
sciences argument about human organization in general, with all the ethnographic 
salt, the specificity and contingency, leached away.
Chainsaws and masks
What to make of these claims? Both are appealing, and yet both have aspects that 
could be fairly seen as unsettling as well. Distilled to its rhetorical extremes, we are 
between the Scylla of a universal dividualist logic and a stultifying denial of any 
capacity for a fundamental change in personhood that goes beyond reshuffling and 
renaming, and Charybdis of a runaway Western mental imperialism that denies 
both the continuation of a distinctive mode of Melanesian personhood and of the 
existence of minor traditions in Christianity that would undo the self-possessed 
liberal subject that seems to increasingly mark global imaginaries.
The framing just presented is a bit of intellectual violence, but it is important 
to understand that in venues outside of academic anthropology, similar issues are 
thought through with greater levels of animosity and intellectual violence, vio-
lence that threatens to go beyond the merely metaphoric. A case in point: as of 
the time of this writing (early 2014), the Papuan Parliamentary building in the 
capital of Port Moresby is still marred by what some describe as an attack. To un-
derstand the significance of this fact it helps to know about the context of symbolic 
and political contestation that led to this attack. And knowing about this context 
also involves knowing about the damaged building itself. Designed by Australian 
architect Cecil Hogan, the Papua New Guinea parliamentary building quotes, in 
shape and hue if not in material, the haus tambaran associated with Sepik region, 
a locale that, while no means representative of Papua New Guinea as a whole, has 
strong nationalist resonance. Other architectural features were intended to recall 
both Highlands Men’s Houses as well as structures from the Chimbu region. In 
consort, this is meant to at least harken to if not all the peoples of New Guinea, at 
least the major geographic regions, “the highlands and the lowlands, the coast and 
the interior.” (Rosi 1991: 297). A series of murals and decorative facades continue 
this theme.
As a part of this nation-building aesthetic endeavor, the structure had a series 
of woodcarvings made to resemble masks placed in a lintel immediately above the 
main doorway. These ancestral masks are a stylistic feature of certain Sepik haus 
tambarans but, in this context, they represent the nineteen provinces of the nation. 
Although individual motifs mark a regional or tribal identity, when incorporated 
into the overall iconographic program they are appropriated as symbols of a newly 
created (invented) national heritage enriched, according to official rhetoric, by its 
diversity (Rosi 1991: 300).
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The interior of the building is also an exercise in nation building. If one were 
to enter the building and walk around its “cathedral” like space, one would come 
across “the most dramatic embellishment of the grand entrance hall . . . an assem-
blage of carved wooden poles that rises fifteen meters toward the ceiling” (Rosi 
1991: 301–2). Cut from the forests of the northern coast, these great logs of kwila 
wood were transported to the National Arts School and worked on collectively 
by the carvers of the production team to create a syncretic work of artistic tradi-
tions from all over the nation. This sculpture was entitled Bung Wantaim, a term 
made popular by politicians during the national election campaigns, signifying a 
“true coming together.” The meaning of this work lies not only in the visual impact 
of harmoniously integrating a mixture of styles but also in the importance of the 
creative process whereby artists from diverse areas put aside their political differ-
ences to work cooperatively on a shared venture. Standing in the entrance hall to 
the chamber, the carved poles are a visual model for the necessary operation of 
the democratic parliamentary system, reminding politicians and other Papua New 
Guineans of the need for collaboration and mutual respect in the nation’s highly 
pluralistic society (Rosi 1991: 302).
As might be imagined, a project this ambitious has not gone without criticism. 
Despite its attempt to allude to PNG’s diversity, the project had been described 
as overly “Sepik centered,” and derided for both the reliance on expatriate firms 
during construction and for the resources wasted in the construction of a monu-
ment that would only be enjoyed on a regular basis by the country’s elites. Given 
this criticism, one might foresee that these aspects of the edifice would be inviting 
targets for a symbolic attack.
In December of 2013, this predication would have seemed to come true. A 
chainsaw was used to take down both the carved poles in the interior as well as 
the series of decorative mask-like woodcarvings; more would have been removed 
but for the fact that their destruction would endanger the structural integrity of 
the building. Many protested its destruction, which was framed as pure vandalism. 
The person who ordered this destruction defended himself by claiming that the 
carvings were evil and that their removal was necessary to rid the parliament of 
baleful “spiritual influence.” The person who ordered the chainsaw attack was not 
someone challenging the privileged place given to the Sepik people or protesting 
the gulf between the elites and the masses indexed by the existence of such a lavish 
building in this still impoverished nation-state. Rather, it was Theo Zurenoc, the 
Speaker of Parliament for Papua New Guinea; his intention was to destroy the art 
so that he could “replace the pole with a ‘Pillar of Unity,’ which will contain a Bible, 
a copy of the constitution and feature an everlasting flame and an inscription stat-
ing ‘The Word of God.’”1
Just as many publicly decried this unilateral act, carried out without consultation 
of the full parliament, others—including evangelical leaders—celebrated it. Some 
1. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/australiaandthepacific/papuanewguin-
ea/10534323/Evangelical-Christian-speaker-of-Papua-New-Guineas-parliament-de-
stroys-evil-pagan-carvings.html, 
 http://www.pngfacts.com/44/post/2013/12/zurenoucsays-he-is-within-rights-to-
renovate-parliament.html, retrieved January 29, 2014.
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Christian supporters saw the masks as running counter to Papuan New Guinea’s 
self-proclaimed status as a “Christian Nation.” As one said to Radio New Zealand:
So I see a great contradiction, going into a place which is pretty much 
crammed with all kinds of idols and carvings and what have you. Because 
Papua New Guinea being a complex kind of country, people believe in all 
these kinds of things and for that to be hanging around there in the law-
making house, it’s a clear contradiction. The Bible’s very explicit about 
that. It calls them idols and they need to be burned.2
Reverend Walters, an evangelical member of the clergy, also defended Zurenoc, 
this time pointing not to a problem of religious diversity but of unsettling inheri-
tances that need to be avoided.
Papua New Guinea has basically originated from an animistic society 
.  .  . and those things that we used to pay homage and respect to were 
unmystically, paganistically-based [sic],” Reverend Walters told Pacific 
Beat.
If you take a closer look at this big totem pole inside and the faces 
that have been carved, you will be surprised to find that they don’t really 
resemble any Papua New Guinean face,” he said.
They’re faces are of Egyptian gods, they’re faces of Mongoloids, the 
face of the Buddha, or Maori-like kind of appearances.3
Later in the article, Reverend Walters mentions that for years, there have been 
people militating for the removal of these objects. “A lot of people, including par-
liamentarians have asked for the removal of these things, because it does not truly 
represent Papua New Guinea,” he said. “They’re just from one or two provinces that 
as you know that are steeped in . . . things of the dark ages, or dark people.”4 Given 
these statements, it seems unlikely Zurenoc and his supporters have any regrets, or 
are likely to issue any apologies.
In these quotations we have the question of continuity and discontinuity 
in Papuan religious practice, and of the Melanesian nature of this new religious 
practice, clearly articulated; this is a distillation of at least one leg of the Mosko-
Robbins debate, fleshed out and brought to life outside of the academic arena. But 
it is brought in a fashion where the divisions are at times turned on themselves. 
Papua is presented as a society with an animist history, but the choice of tense sug-
gests that this has been overcome. This overcoming of a primary animism, though, 
comes hand in hand with a realization that the “roots” of Papuan society were never 
Papuan to begin with—the figures that Papuans use to “pay homage and respect” to 
were never indigenous. Rather, they were impositions from abroad, the proximate 
origin of which was traceable by a set of racialized phylogenetic markers that point 
2. http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/230595/png-man-supports-
parliament-speaker’s-removal-of-carved-heads, retrieved January 28, 2014.
3. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-17/an-png-parliament-speaker-saga/5160410, 
retrieved January 28, 2014.
4. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-12-17/an-png-parliament-speaker-saga/5160410, 
retrieved January 28, 2014.
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to these gods as an exterior import, perhaps even an exterior imposition. (This 
need for an exterior origin for the masks might be made more immediate after the 
admission by Community Development Minister Loujaya Kouza, who had assisted 
Zurenoc in ordering the act, that she had been advised to take this act by an “an 
Israel-based Messianic group”; Zurenoc himself denies that this group has had any 
influence on his decision.)5 At the same time, the concession that there is a con-
tinuity of worship in “one or two provinces” of “dark people” undoes this logic of 
paganism as both something vanquished by Christianity, and as a mode of religios-
ity that is not properly Papuan.
It does not take a heroic amount of hermeneutic labor to be able to turn 
Reverend Walter’s statements into an instance of Freudian displacement, where 
anxieties about an imported Jesus, phylogenetically marked as white, are laun-
dered. But there are further ironies in this situation. The Director of the National 
Museum and Art Gallery, Dr. Andrew Moutu, ascribes a sort of fetishism (Keane 
2007) to Zurenoc:
The first problem is that he inputs a lot of causality, he attributes a lot of 
causality to the power of Satan and his frontiers of spirits to influence 
the behaviour and basically they’re attributing all these things to the fact 
that the economic decline, social discord and monies and so on are all an 
outcome of his spiritual cause and therefore they’re trying to do this in 
order to try and purge the nation, as it were.6
Here, it is the Christians who are presented as imagining themselves susceptible 
to occult forces, permeable personages vulnerable in a way that cannot but help 
summon up the idea of partible subjects; it is instead Dr. Moutu, who speaks for 
the masks and for the valuing of a Melanesian cultural tradition, who uses the 
Protestant language of self-possessed individuals who cannot project causal forces 
to nonhuman actors but must bear moral responsibility on their own.7 Dr. Moutu’s 
response could be seen as that of a melancholic modern, fighting for the remem-
brance of a way of life seen as already superseded, but even if it is granted that this is 
the preferred reading in this particular case, a religious strain, whether nationalistic 
or a back-projection onto pre-Christian relations with supernatural alters, can still 
be sensed in his position when he refers to Zurenoc’s acts as a “heinous sacrilege.”8
5. http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/papua-new-guinea/3990/arrest-speaker-png-
trade-union/, retrieved January 29, 2014; for a very insightful discussion of the way 
in which the “State of Israel” served as an index for the “God of Israel” in debates, see 
Handman (2015b).
6. http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/png-
speaker-removes-images-from-parliament-as-ungodly/1231094 retrieved January 29, 
2014.
7. Dr. Moutu is a former PhD student of Marilyn Strathern. For his PhD research he car-
ried out fieldwork in Kanganamun village on the Sepik River, Papua New Gunea, dur-
ing which time he was also inducted into the men’s initiation cult there. We would like 
to thank Camille Roussel for bringing this to our attention.
8. http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2013/12/removal-of-parliaments-heritage-
carvings-is-heinous-sacrilege.html retrieved January 29, 2014.
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But even this division, between a Christianity that would have the masks de-
stroyed and a self-possessed Melanesian position that sees the masks as part of 
a national patrimony, is again too procrustean. There are in fact multiple posi-
tions that are all coded as being “Christian”; however, this shared self-designation 
does not create any kind of commensurability, either at the level of concept or of 
politics, between those who side with the masks and those who side with Zurenoc. 
Organizations on record as regretting Zurenoc’s actions include the Catholic 
Bishops conference of Papua New Guinea and the PNG Council of Churches; these 
groups maintain that, pace Zurenoc, there is no need for a forced choice between 
a Melanesian cultural sensitivity and a Christian message.9 These groups, at least, 
seem to not be marked by anxieties about demonic influence. To those who back 
the chainsaw-renovation, though, this lack of concern about influence and conta-
gion makes these supposed Christians that much more dangerous and that much 
more beyond the pale. Zurenoc is quoted as saying that he does not wish to meet 
with the PNG Council of Churches to discuss this matter because it is not “neces-
sary.” As one article reports, he feels that some elements in the Council of Churches 
“had strong beliefs in some cultures that were not appropriate.”10 Conversely, some 
Christians warn that Zurenoc’s action is a sign that fundamentalism is “creeping” 
into Papua New Guinea and is influencing or actually controlling positions of pow-
er with the parliament and government.11
Both Zurenoc’s action and the responses it elicited are having effects that exceed 
the mere profession of a particular position. Eight parliamentarians have called for 
Zurenoc to be relieved of his position as speaker, and the prime minister attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to halt the destruction; a former speaker doubted that Zurenoc will 
retain his position long into the new year (a prognostication that was incorrect). There 
are juridical problems as well. The legality of the action has been challenged, and a 
public trade union has called for the speaker’s arrest on charges of destroying public 
property. The Post Courier made this story headline news for two weeks, culminating 
in an editorial that labeled Zurenoc as a “cultural terrorist,” an act in itself that in turn 
triggered a call from a “Christian lawyer” who called for the newspaper to be boycot-
ted. Others warn that this situation can lead to what is obliquely called “conflict.”12
9. http://cathnews.co.nz/2013/12/13/png-bishops-disappointed-carvings-removed-par-
liament-buildings/, retrieved January 29, 2014; 
 http://cathnews.co.nz/2013/12/20/png-evangelical-church-leader-supports-removal-
carvings-parliament/, retrieved January 29, 2014.
10. http://cathnews.co.nz/2013/12/20/png-evangelical-church-leader-supports-removal-
carvings-parliament/, retrieved January 29, 2014.
11. http://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/230573/png-catholic-confer-
ence-slams-speaker-over-carvings-removal, retrieved January 29, 2014.
12. http://dev.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/culture-fading-away/#.UujxC3k4lz8;
 http://asopa.typepad.com/asopa_people/2013/12/christian-lawyer-calls-for-boycott-
of-post-courier-newspaper.html; http://www.islandsbusiness.com/news/papua-new-
guinea/3990/arrest-speaker-png-trade-union/; 
 http://dev.postcourier.com.pg/Stories/parlt-move-fuels-tension/#.Uuj4RHk4lz8, 
retrieved January 29, 2014.
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Taking the mask off of the problematic
While this moment in Papuan New Guinea politics and religion may be singular, it 
is certainly not a novelty. Papua New Guinea is not the first postcolony to struggle 
with what it means to be a self-declared “Christian Nation,” Zurenoc is not the first 
Christian to try to escape anxieties of influence by an attempt to make a “complete 
break with the past,” Reverend Walters is not the first believer to try to disown a 
pagan past, and Dr. Moutu is not the first person to attempt to make commensu-
rable prior forms of life and the contemporary religious imagination (Barker 2012; 
Eriksen 2009; Handman 2011; Haynes forthcoming; Daswani 2015; Meyer 1998). 
We should also not ignore the fact that this event is also a medium to debate other 
concerns about the Papua New Guinea state, from anxieties about the possibility 
of secularism, to questions as to whether there could be a way to symbolize the 
disparate Papuan social and political groups as a united national community, to 
whether liberalism as a political program is desirable to the majority of people of 
Papua New Guinea (Schram 2014). Still, that does not mean that there is nothing 
that can be taken away from this for our purposes. There are two object-lessons 
that the parliamentary imbroglio holds out for us. One is about the true weight of 
this special section’s question and one is about its expansiveness.
First, questions of the constitution of the personhood are questions of political 
theology, in that the autonomy and dependence of subjects, their indivisibility, and 
permutability, will be played out through relations to authority and forms of vul-
nerability that will shape the terrain of collective life (see also Handman 2015a). To 
speak about Christianity in Papua New Guinea, no matter how that Christianity is 
realized, is now to speak of a pre-Christian past and a national future, to speak of 
the collective propriety and the collective dangers of various modes of personhood. 
This underscores the real inseparability of conceptually isolatable components at 
this particular moment in the political history of PNG.
Second, these theo-political constellations of personhood are capable of being 
the object of contestation. Contestation does not necessarily mean a difference in 
the formal qualities, of course. One is capable of imagining opposed collectivities 
who are both organized by the logic of an individualized, ethically responsible self, 
just as it is easy to hypothesize different networks of dividuals, each entangled in 
their own separate milieus, and whose only common relation with one another is 
that of enmity. But if either of these hypotheticals were the case, one might imag-
ine that this contestation would be illuminated by a certain amount of mutual 
understanding and respect derived from the fact that their positions, while sub-
stantively opposing each other, also mirror each other in the organizational logic. 
It is hard to identify glimmers of such respect in the debate over the parliament 
building.
This sense that there are opposing immanent modes of organizing is heightened 
when one considers the lack of agreement between those figures who seem them-
selves as speaking on behalf of Christianity. Is it that the members of the Council of 
Churches and the Catholic Bishop’s Conference have no fears of spiritual contami-
nation because it is fetishistic, or that they simply feel that other relations either 
eclipse or preclude possible supernatural “pagan” forces? How does one account for 
such variation in opinion and in claims of self-identity?
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At one level, it is impossible to force anthropology to march at the pace of jour-
nalism and close these questions down so soon after they have been broached. At 
another level, closing them down may not be just methodologically impractical, 
but a theoretical mistake. The theoretical problems that the anthropologist is faced 
with in moments such as these are the same problems that the actors themselves are 
forced to take up, though emphasis, temporality, and urgency may torque this fact 
to such a degree that this identity is obscured.
The question of course is where this shared problem is situated and how it 
makes itself felt. In some cases, this makes its appearance as a consciously elabo-
rated crisis, the sort that demands a choice as to what practices will be taken up 
to manage the risk and to control a potential emergency, an ethical, spiritual, or 
political calamity that is always threatening to open itself up (Foucault 1990: 11; see 
also Rabinow 2002). But this is still a snapshot of the problem at an advanced stage 
of concretization, already having gone through substantial discursive coding. This 
is a stage of problematization where the gap between the problem and the institu-
tions and practices that are a response to it are not so great that one cannot sense a 
resemblance between the two.
There is another sense of the problematic, though, which subtends the Foucaul-
dian framing, where the problem is not so much a discursively articulated chal-
lenge but rather a point where the relation between elements is not fixed; rather, 
they are cross-cutting arrays formed by transversing degrees of potential openness 
and closure, of alienability or integrity, of vulnerability or immunity, of proxim-
ity or distance to inhuman forces (who themselves are composed by differently 
arrayed potentia). Each one of these aspects can be articulated at various intensi-
ties, and the combinatory manner in which these intensities—and several other in-
tensities as well, specific to the situation—will control the characteristics found in 
any particular actualization. Here, “it is the problem which orientates, conditions 
and engenders solutions, but these do not resemble the conditions of the problem” 
(Deleuze 1994: 212).
A shift to problematization and to the genetic allows at once for different re-
alizations—subjectively different worlds—but without foreclosing either alterna-
tive realizations or differential shades in the formation of these subjective worlds, 
which give rise to contestation and further actualizations of the problematic. This 
is of use because we are now not forced to think in terms of genus and species, 
stamping some modes of life as dividual or individual, but allowed to ask what 
are the processes that allow a range of variations in modes of relation and person-
hood that would encompass both of these hypostases. And there is every reason 
to suspect that the various realizations may tend to the transitory, the unstable, or 
the frustrating—there is no promise that problematization is not insolvable, or that 
there should be any particular actualization that is bearable for the subject.
And here we come to the point. As our history of the anthropological career of 
these categories indicated, the question of either dividualism or an individualism 
(be it ethical or “possessive”) is not a question that is particular to the anthropology 
of Christianity alone; indeed these same debates were visited without a Christian 
supplement decades ago. And like this moment, we were faced with two options, 
either a choice between an unbearable binary, or a milk-and-water claim that all 
humans are admixtures of both, without thinking what the underlying tensions 
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might be that gives rise to such a variegated mode of subjectivity. This does not 
have to be—and is probably not—a simple, two-axis combinatory affair.
If the idea of in/dividuality is not a simple two-axis affair, then how do we make 
sense of the divisions and the binary oppositions that continue to plague defini-
tions of personhood and the underlying theories that serve to connect individuals 
to “society,” Christian or otherwise (Bamford and Leach 2009)? The many attempts 
to resolve the problem of whether a person is an individual or dividual do not allow 
for other questions to be asked and limit the scope and scale of the discussion. In 
his recent introduction to a special issue on Christian personhood in the Journal of 
Religion in Africa, Simon Coleman (2011) pointed out that while some anthropolo-
gists (e.g., LiPuma 1998) may argue that we should see all cultures as containing 
both individual and dividual modalities of personhood, individuality and dividual-
ity need to be understood along different levels or scales of analysis and should be 
compared with cultural practice (see also Boddy 1998). Methodologically speaking, 
he claims, the levels and styles of dividuality/individuality may “vary in the same 
religious tradition, in response to other political, social, and cultural demands” 
(Coleman 2011: 246; see similarly Bialecki 2015). This is not so different from our 
observations of multiplicity in the PNG controversy over the public display and 
the subsequent destruction of the wooden masks and the totemic poles that were 
erected in their parliamentary building. This event and the debates that ensued 
foregrounded several different (op)positions around how a Christian—individual 
and/or dividual—identity might or could be expressed appropriately. They raised 
several questions: Were Papuans still connected to their ancestral and indigenous 
past?; were they Christians who comfortably moved between their traditional past 
and their status as heaven’s anointed?; or were they modernists who believed that 
these objects held no power in themselves and were only representative of (in)sin-
cere but invalid objections?
An important observation is that these different groups and voices in PNG were 
using the traditional masks to speak about other masks of collective representa-
tion that they felt they metaphorically wore. Masks both actual and metaphorical, 
whether pointing to dividual multiplicity or individual singularity, can be thought 
of as the concretized, extensive expression of the underlying intensive problemat-
ics and ethical problematizations. In Marcel Mauss’ 1938 lecture “A category of 
the human mind: The notion of person; the notion of self ” (1985), he argued that 
Christianity was central to the development of the idea of the individual and to the 
movement away from the primary importance given to the “role” (personnage) or 
ritual mask assumed in the unfolding of sacred dramas. Mauss (1985: 20) famously 
wrote: “it is from the notion of the ‘one’ that the notion of person was created . . . 
indivisible and individual.” The moral person, once represented by the character 
or the mask, had become “synonymous with the true nature of the individual” (17) 
and eventually with the “category of ‘self ’” (moi) (20). Even as Mauss proposed 
a historical emergence of the Christian individual (see also Dumont 1985), his 
analysis of masks continues to be relevant to an understanding of the person, in 
that masks represented the personne morale, the role and the office they held in 
life, allowing them to become certain types of moral persons. Since Mauss, others 
have argued that rather than seeing the actor as simply the recipient of person-
hood, we should start with the masks available to them in a society and look into 
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how they are taken up by and allocated to different individuals and groups (see 
Fortes 1987: 251).
In his book Religion, morality and the person Meyer Fortes (1987: 252–3) used a 
quote, from Marcel Proust, to argue that the Maussian “moral person” is intrinsic to 
understanding human society as a whole. “The kitchen-maid was a moral person, 
a permanent institution to which invariable attributes assured a sort of continuity 
and identity, through the succession of passing shapes in which it incarnated itself; 
for we never had the same two years in a row” (Proust 1945: 97, our translation).
His point was that the institutional role or office that the person holds is important 
in creating stability and continuity over time and is distinct from the person who 
holds it. He was interested in the question of how the individual knows herself to 
be the person she is made to be (Fortes 1987: 279). In other words, how does one 
demonstrate a sincerity of personhood that is publicly knowable over time, and 
that the mask is not merely a personal propensity for role-playing? The different 
positions taken during the PNG debate over the appropriate (spiritual) character 
of the wooden masks and the totemic pillars revealed a variety of personage morale 
that each held in reclaiming a morally appropriate personhood, in opposition to an 
inappropriate past that continued to haunt the present. Our own anthropological 
past is not without its own controversies, ghosts, and ideological struggles over 
how to best represent Western and non-Western indigenous persons. If the ideas 
surrounding the “mask” (persona) represent different ideological characters and 
positions about personhood, they can also become the battleground for controver-
sial claims over who is right (or has rights) and when. The Mosko-Robbins debate 
is one case in point. But, as we have suggested, the story goes further back, in ways 
that suggest again that anthropologists are more like their Papuan neighbors and 
interlocutors than they sometimes care to admit.
This set of articles attempt at once to harmonize these oppositions, but only in 
order to mark other forms of schism and differentiation that this binary occludes: 
to countereffectuate the extensive forms to work back to the underlying virtual 
problematic, which is itself constituted of heterogeneous independent variables. 
Our goal is not so much to take off the mask, or group masks into categories, but 
ask how it is that these masks are continually fabricated in the first instance. How 
are these problems structured, and what role do they play in the different Christian 
societies anthropologists study? In short, what space is there for variance, reso-
nances, or play in these counterpoised terms, something that would go beyond a 
sterile opposition? Our essays collectively ask whether it is possible to break down 
the in/dividualist distinction and think it anew, and thereby apprehend the forms 
in which new modes of interrelatedness might appear to us. These articles, while 
situated in different ethnographic sites of operation and entanglement (including 
Europe, Melanesia, and South East Asia) challenge and engage with Western and 
Christian cosmological assumptions as well as local systems of knowledge con-
cerning personhood.
They are linked to a commonly asked question, regarding “Who is a Christian?” 
(Garriott and O’Neill 2008). How do we know what Christian personhood is at 
any moment in time if not for how it is revealed through the different contexts of 
articulation and political claims of difference? Yet they also engage with another 
question that is less frequently asked, but equally important, which is “When is 
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a Christian” (Bialecki 2012)? For example, when does individuality or dividual-
ity become an “actable-on-capacity” (Humphrey 2008: 363)? If processes of indi-
vidual self-fashioning can only partly be realized in rituals or formal acts of public 
recognition, then we have to acknowledge that Christians ask questions regarding 
how much they are part of others and how much of themselves is determined by 
the acts of others (Daswani 2011, 2015). These questions around the processes of 
self-formation arise at different times and moments in their lives. And what would 
happen in moments when two or more contradictory roles are held simultaneously 
in a single institution or in an individual subject? Even if an “either/or” logic (either 
Christian or non-Christian) is generally applied in Christianity—and within other 
exclusivist religions—this does not exclude a “both/and” logic that simultaneously 
permeates its sociality and that is often realized through the ethical decisions with 
which people struggle with over time. For example it is more often observed that 
alongside notions of relationalism and dividualism, ideas of individualism become 
more important when Christians are considering the end-times or when imagining 
a life in heaven (Robbins 2002; 2004; Vilaça 2011).
As a concept-metaphor “Personhood” lies in the same ontological regime as Kin-
ship, Magic, and Gift Exchange, wherein ideas such as individuality and dividuality 
theoretically overlap with other anthropological dualities, such as nature and cul-
ture, object and subject, science and magic, commodity and gift (Viveiros de Castro 
2009). The essays included here propose a dialogue between these different themes 
and their interrelated terms. Is there an unresolved tension between the individual or 
dividual focus in any definition of personhood and the ways in which Christian lives 
are lived? In helping provide an answer to this question Simon Coleman (this issue) 
is also drawn back to Marcel Mauss’ idea of the “mask,” which, according to him, 
serves as a useful mediating trope between individuality and dividuality. Replacing 
Mauss’ diachronic reading of personhood with an analysis of the tensions and ne-
gotiations of multiple forms of personhood, as they coexist within the Word of Life 
Church in Sweden, Coleman provides a synchronic reading of Mauss in order to elu-
cidate the transactional and performative aspects of relationships between self and 
other and self and self. In the Prosperity practices he writes about, a “remaking” of 
the self is accompanied by the “remasking” of the self in a transactional orientation, 
which considers the tensions and the combined functions of amplification (reaching 
out beyond the self) and incorporation (taking aspects of others into oneself).
Asking a similarly important question regarding how actors account for the ten-
sions within different frames of reference and actions accorded to individuality and 
dividuality, Ryan Schram (this issue) demonstrates how two seemingly incompat-
ible cases of mourning are brought into manifest expression in Auhelawa, Papua 
New Guinea. Schram describes how, during funerals rites in Auhelawa society, two 
types of feasts are often spoken about—a traditional set of exchanges located within 
a set of kinship relations that emphasizes difference (bwabwale) and a Christian 
one that advocates that no exchange of gifts takes place and that emphasizes simi-
larity (masele). Schram explains that rather than being opposite frames of reference 
such models of mourning are actually in dialogue with one another and used in 
complementary and pragmatic ways, where, in practice, people either ambiguously 
shift between one and the other or mix them together, thereby positing different 
kinds of persons.
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Like Schram’s piece, Liana Chua’s account (this issue) of personhood among the 
Christian Bidayuh of Malaysian Borneo also turns to funerary rites to better grasp 
in/dividualization as a process. Here though, rather than identifying two discrete 
(though dialogically and pragmatically complementary) forms of funeral feast, for 
the Bidayuh funerals and their associated wakes work at once to create both di-
vidual and individual relations. Through fostering distinctly different sets of “hori-
zontal” relations with consociates and “vertical” relations with God, these wakes 
insure that the dead are individuated, while the living are further imbricated in so-
cial ties that encourage a rich sense of interbeing. These mortuary practices may be 
exemplary in the production of these ties for the Bidayuh, but they do not exhaust 
them. As Chua shows in this article, dividualizing and individualizing forces not 
only coexist throughout the Bidayuh but this economy of forces forms the ethical 
taken-for-granted; she notes that the small Evangelical Protestant SIB community, 
which is more (though still not completely) individuated, comes across to the ma-
jority of Catholic and Anglican Bidayuh as unworldly, not balancing horizontal 
relations with the necessary vertical relations that would allow the SIB to be more 
thoroughly embedded in the community.
By way of contrast with the rest of the contributors, Mark Mosko retains his 
position that Christianity—both in Melanesia and the West—is properly framed as 
dividual; but even here, we have an account that sees dividualism and individual-
ism as having, at least in some dispensations, an intimate relationship. Rereading 
foundational authors such as Burridge, Weber, and Dumont in light of his previ-
ous “Partible Penitents” argument, Mosko claims that the forms of both early and 
Reformation-era Christian personhood and exchange are not reducible to the sort 
of possessive individualism found in Macpherson’s account of late-modern pos-
sessive individualism. Rather, claims regarding the individual in Burridge, Weber, 
and Dumont were attempts to articulate a set of internal and external relations that 
had not yet had a proper term; the use of individualism by these authors, Mosko 
suggests, should be read as an effect of their not have the concept of dividual as an 
extant analytic category at the time that their works were penned. However, Mosko 
argues, now that dividualism has been added to our intellectual repertoire, a close 
reading of the divine economies of grace, charisms, and spirit described in their 
works bear a greater resemblance not to the possessive individualism of autono-
mous agents, exercising power over external and indifferent objects, but rather to 
the sort of economies of personhood found in dividualist milieus. This similarity 
between Western Christian dividualisms and other dividualisms, however, should 
not be taken for an identity. The key to the Western Christian dividualism as un-
derstood by Mosko is the presence of a split subject, sundered not by a Freudian 
process of repression but by the classical Durkheimian opposition between the sa-
cred and the profane. As Christian subjects approach the holiness and salvation, 
engaging in various purifying spiritual practices and circulations of grace to pro-
duce sacred selves, their sacred and profane aspects undergo “separation, transi-
tion, and reaggregation” (this issue). Mosko claims these processes produce actors 
who may appear to be individuals, and who may even understand themselves to be 
individuals as well. However, these individuals exist only as an emergent effect of 
underlying and constitutive dividual operations and can in no way be mistaken for 
the individualisms associated with late capitalism.
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Taken together as a whole then, this set of articles collectively look at the various 
ways in which the scopes, scales, and scapes of Christian personhood converge, the 
modalities of how in/dividualizing forces interact with one another. They take up 
the ways in which (1) scopes (the spatial-temporal and institutional vectors that de-
fine Christian personhood and its variant social imaginaries); (2) scales (the mul-
tiple levels of entry, exclusion, and interaction involved in the social forms); and (3) 
scapes (the various links between culture and personhood) intersect, and thereby 
allow for very different ways of imagining Christian in/dividuality. Multiplying lay-
ers and temporalities, intensities, and speeds, these articles locate themselves in the 
no-man’s-land between world religion and autochthonous logics, between porous 
and impermeable selves, between a social that is marked and one that erases itself; 
in sum, between dividualism(s) and individualism(s), Christian and otherwise.
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Qu’est-ce qu’un individu? Le point de vue du christianisme
Résumé : L’introduction de ce dossier de Hau porte sur les conceptualisations de 
la personne ayant recours aux notions d’individualisme et de dividualisme. Si cet 
essai approche cette thématique majeure de l’anthropologie à travers le christia-
nisme, plus largement son but est de rouvrir le débat portant sur le concept d’in/
dividualisme afin de voir s’il est possible d’imaginer des relations différentes entre 
ces deux manières d’être. Cette introduction se propose de contribuer au débat 
en présentant l’histoire des concepts d’individualisme et de dividualisme, en exa-
minant la controverse récente sur la notion de personne chrétienne divisible en 
Mélanésie, et en évoquant des débats sur la relation entre religion, nation et état en 
Papouasie-Nouvelle-Guinée, entamés à la suite de dommages subis par le bâtiment 
du parlement de Papouasie. Après avoir effectué la synthèse de cet ensemble de 
matériaux, nous proposons de ré-orienter le débat sur l’in/dividualisme. Plutôt que 
de concevoir le dividualisme et l’individualisme comme une simple heuristique, 
ou comme des notions engagées dans un conflit vivace sur l’organisation du sujet, 
nous suggérons qu’il est plus fructueux de penser l’in/dividualisme comme l’actua-
lisation d’une problématique unitaire et sous-jacente. Il s’agit d’une problématique 
non seulement pour l’anthropologue, mais également pour ses interlocuteurs; et en 
tant que problématique apparente en différents lieux, nous devons nous attendre à 
trouver non seulement une grande diversité de cristallisations dividuelles et indi-
viduelles de la personne, mais également à observer des milieux ethnographiques 
multiples, exprimant les relations complexes et émergentes entre des formes vi-
vaces de dividualismes et d’individualismes.
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